

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 H-03 NSC-07 SS-20

DRC-01 /161 W

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R 081626Z APR 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2378

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 3142

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: PRESS STATEMENT BY NETHERLANDS  
REP QUARLES

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT TO BE GIVEN BY NETHERLANDS  
REP QUARLES AT PRESS CONFERENCE APRIL 10, AS APPROVED BY  
AD HOC GROUP APRIL 5. BEGIN TEXT:

1. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE NOW GOING TO HAVE ANOTHER SHORT  
RECESS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO ALLOW TIME FOR CONSULTATION  
WITH GOVERNMENTS. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL RESUME IN VIENNA DURING  
THE WEEK OF MAY 6. THIS SEEMS AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO  
MEET WITH YOU TO SIDCUSS THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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2. AT MY LAST PRESS BRIEFING ON JANUARY 14, I DISCUSSED WITH

YOU THE GENERAL APPROACH EACH SIDE HAS TAKEN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. TO SET MY REMARKS TODAY IN PRPER PERSPECTIVE, LET ME RECAL FOR YOU BRIEFLY WHAT THOSE GENERAL POSITIONS ARE.

3. THE OVERALL AIM OF THE WESTERN ALLIES IS TO ESTABLISH THROUGH REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE A MORE STABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THIS MEANS ELIMINATING THE PRESENT IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES, WHEREBY THE EASTERN SIDE HAS 150,000 MORE MEN IN THE AREA THAN THE WEST. ACCORDINGLY, THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE FINAL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BE A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FOR BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THIS GOAL BE REACHED IN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. IN THE FIRST PHASE, AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND AT THE SAME TIME TO REDUCE THE DISPARITY OF 9,500 TANKS WHICH EXISTS IN THE AREA. PARTICIPANTS WOULD ALSO AGREE IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATION. IN THE SECOND PHASE, AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, DOWN TO A COMMON CEILING. THIS, IN GENREAL TERMS, IS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS.

4. WE THINK THE OUTCOME WOULD BE ENHANCED SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES. WE DON'T AGREE WITH THE KIND OF ARGUMENTATION WHICH CLAIMS THAT OUR PROPOSALS WOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN OUR SECURITY, BUT LESS SECURITY FOR THE EAST. WE THINK IT IS UNREALISTIC TO CONSIDER SECURITY AS A GIVEN FIXED QUANTITY, WHRE, IF ONE SIDES GAINS MORE OF IT IN NEGOTIATION, THE OTHER WILL AUTOMATICALLY HAVE LESS. TO THE CONTRARY, IN A SITUATION OF OVERALL NUCLEAR PARITY, SECURITY IS EQUALLY SHARED OR EQUALLY MISSING ON BOTH SIDES. IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT, BOTH SIDES WILL GAIN IN SECURITY BECAUSE WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL BECOME LESS LIKELY.

5. NOW AS TO THE EASTERN APPROACH: THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WISH TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING RATIOO BETWEEN THE FORCES OF EAST AND WEST, AND BETWEEN THE VARIOUS FORCE COMPONENTS ON EACH SIDE, SIMPLY ON THE GROUND THAT IT EXISTS, AND TO USE IT AS THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, THEY HAVE PROPOSED THREE STAGES OF REDUCTION. ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
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WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN EACH STATE, BY AN EQUAL NUMBER OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE. MOREOVER, ALL TYPES OF FORCES -- INCLUDING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES -- WOULD BE INVLUDED. AS I INDICATED IN MY LAST PRESS BRIEFING, WE BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH -- APART FROM ITS COMPLEXITY -- WOULD NOT SERVE TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. INSTEAD, IT WOULD PERPETUATE THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. EVEN MORE, IT WOULD ACTUALLY WORSEN IT.

6. NOW I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO A REVIEW OF HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS

ARE GOING AND GIVE YOU OUR ASSESSMENT OF WHERE MATTERS STAND AT PRESENT. BROADLY SPEAKING, WE FEEL THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE GOING AS WELL AS COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED AT THIS STAGE. IN AN UNPRECEDENTED NEGOTIATION OF THIS KIND, WITH 19 COUNTRIES TAKING PART, AND WITH HIGHLY COMPLEX, HIGHLY SENSITIVE ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED, ONE DOES NOT EXPECT RAPID PROGRESS. PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE ARE REQUIRED. THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE TIME. IT IS CLEAR THAT WE STILL HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO.

7. NEVERTHELESS, WE FEEL THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROCEEDING AT A STEADY PACE. THE COHESION OF THE WESTERN ALLIES CONTINUES TO BE EXCELLENT. THE TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS AMONG PARTICIPANTS OF EAST AND WEST CONTINUES TO BE BUSINESSLIKE. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE DEVELOPED ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES. BOTH SIDES HAVE LEARNED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE BACKGROUND WHICH WILL SERVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE BOTH SIDES ARE DEMONSTRATING A SERIOUS INTEREST IN COMING TO AN AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE THIS YEAR.

8. TO BE SURE, WE ARE STILL IN THE EXPOSITORY AND EXPLORATORY PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS, EACH SIDE IS STILL ENGAGED IN LAYING OUT ITS POSITION, ADDING CERTAIN DETAILS AND CLARIFICATIONS, JUSTIFYING ITS POSITION, DEFINING THE ISSUES, AND EXPLORING THE VIEWPOINTS OF THE OTHER SIDE IN AN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY AND WIDEN AREAS OF COMMON GROUND FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT. WE HOPE, WHEN WE COME BACK IN MAY, THAT WE CAN MOVE ON TO THE NEXT PHASE OF DEVELOPING SOME OF THESE COMMON POINTS.

9. AS IN ANY NEGOTIA  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 3142

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

FIRST. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, OWING TO THE SIZE OF THEIR MILITARY RESOURCES, AND THEIR STATUS AS MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, BEAR A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND FOR FACILITATING THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THESE TWO MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. MOREOVER, REDUCTING US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IS THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH. IT WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME.

12. WE BELIEVE THAT IT ALSO MAKES GOOD SENSE TO DEFER REDUCTIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR TO A SECOND PHASE, FOLLOWING US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING. SINCE THIS IS AN  
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IMPORTANT POINT FOR US, LET ME DWELL FOR A MOMENT ON THE REASONS.

13. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO WAR IN WUROPE OVER THE PAST TWENTY-NINE YEARS, THE HISTORY OF THAT PERIOD HAS NOT BEEN A HAPPY ONE. IT HAS BEEN A PERIOD OF APPREHENSION AND OF CONCERN, MARKED BY WORRY OVER THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE OF THE USSR AND THE US AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES. NOW, WE ARE ENGATED IN AN UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO REDUCE THAT CONFRONTATION.

14. BUT IT IS PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE CONCERNS AND DOUBTS WHICH HAVE ARISEN DURING THIS PERIOD ARE NOT EASILY DESPELLED AND THAT THEY CONTINUE STRONG. THIS IS WHY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE UNITED IN DESIRING, BEFORE ENTERING ON A COURSE WHICH MAY HAVE AN ENDURING EFFECT ON THEIR SECURITY TO A DEGREE WHICH IS NOT TRUE FOR THE USSR, THAT THE USSR, AND, WITH IT, THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD TAKE THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL STEP IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE BOTH THE GENUINENESS OF ITS GOOD WILL AND THE FEASIBILITY OF THE ENTIRE PROJECT. OF COURSE, THE ALLIES ARE NOT TRYING TO DELAY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION INDEFINITELY. IF THE FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATION IS SATISFACTORY, THE ALLIES ARE WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE.

15. BUT IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT POSSIBLE PHASE I AGREEMENTS WOULD AFFECT ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE FORCES

OF THE US AND OF THE USSR. THE SITUATION OF MOST OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS A DIFFERENT ONE. THEIR ENTIRE TERRITORIES LIE WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

16. THERE IS, IN SHORT, A DISTINCTIVE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATIONS OF THE US AND USSR AND THAT OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, A DIFFERENCE WHICH IN OUR VIEW IS FULLY SUFFICIENT REASON FOR THE LATTER NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN FORCE REDUCTIONS UNTIL THE US AND USSR HAVE SHOWN THE WAY AND THUS CREATED THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE BEFORE WE CAN MOVE ON TO A SECOND PHASE.

17. I WOULD ADD THAT EVEN SMALL REDUCTIONS BY THESE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME OBJECTIONS I HAVE MENTIONED.

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18. NO LET ME TURN TO THE SECOND OF THE TWO MAIN ISSUES WHICH DIVIDED EAST FROM WEST: THE ISSUE OF HOW BEST TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND WHETHER REDUCTION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THAT RISK.

19. AS WE SEE IT, THE TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS TO TAKE THE ESSENTIAL STEPS TO REDUCE, AND IF POSSIBLE ELIMINATE, THE RISK OF CONFLICT BREAKING OUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR THERE IS THE FURTHER RISK THAT SUCH A CONFLICT, ONCE IT BROKE OUT, MIGHT ESCALATE TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NOW, THE RISK THAT CONFLICT MIGHT BREAK OUT ARISES FROM THE IMBALANCE WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THAT IS WHY IT IS NECESSARY  
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